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PREFACE 
The career of Napoleon Bonaparte has been the center of 
considerable controversy o This conflict of opinions becomes 
increasingly evident when one surveys the various accounts of 
his life. What is the value of such a study? The worth lies 
in bringing one to the realization that eaoh generation does, 
to a large degree, write its own history and to the historian 
in particular, the awareness that he must continually strive 
to avoid the pitfalls into which past historians have fallen. 
It is the goal of th is paper to show that writers are often 
influenced by contemporary affairs in making their decisions 
but that by adhering to certain methods they can attain a 
greater m,easure of objectivity o 
The aspect of Napoleon's career that has been studied 
in the preparation of this paper is the Hundred Days, the 
period between March 20, 1815, arrl June 29, 1815. Napoleon 
had returned from Elba, set himself again on the throne of 
France and finally met the combined forces of the allies and 
suffered defeat at the Battle of Waterloo. The Hundred Days 
was selected because it is an area in which writers have 
been in considerable disagreement and illustrates well vari-
ous authors' opinions of Napoleono This paper will be con-
cerned with the 'views of English hi storians of Napoleon's 
Hundred Days between, and including, the years 1815 to 1914. 
iii 
There are numerous aspects of the Hundred Days that are sub-
ject to considerable debate. The chief areas of controversy 
center arou~d Napoleon's return to France; his conduct as a 
constitutional monarch and the Campaign of 1815 
Indebtedness is acknowledged to Drs. Milton I. Vanger 9 
Alfred Levin and Homer Lo Knight for their valuable guidance 
and patient reading of this manuscript; and to Mro A, P. Juhlin 
and the staff of the Special Services Department of the Okla= 
homa State University Library for their assistance in the pro= 
curement of numerous works on Napoleon. 
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A PERIOD OF HOSTILITY, 1815-lSJO 
In order to understand English views of Napoleonvs 
Hundred Days it is necessary to outline the event of this 
episode and those of the preceeding year" In 1814 the 
allied armies had invaded France and on April lli Napoleon 
had abdicated" He had not been defeated, however 1 and was 
able, by the treaty of Fountainbleau, to make arrangements 
for himself and his family, Napoleon was to receive a pen-
sion from the government of France, the Island of Elba and 
retain the title of emperor; pensions were provided for mem-
bers of his familyo 
Napoleon 1 arriving in Elba, set about playing the role 
of emperor in his small kingdom and announced himself as 
politically dead" In fact, however, he observed closely 
the events in France and at the Congress of Vienna. The 
restoration of the Bourbons was caus::Lng widespread dis= 
affection and Napoleon resolved a return to Franceo The 
Bourbons furnished him an excuse by failing to pay his pension. 
On February 27~ 1e15 1 Napoleon and his small army set 
sail for France" On March 1~ they landed at Cannes in South~ 
ern France and began to advance toward Paris; they met no 
opposition for the troops sent by Louis XVIII to capture 
1 
2 
Napoleon joined their old emperor. The towns 9 the peasants , 
the majori ty of the people along his route warmly received 
him o In each place--Grosse 9 Gap 9 Grenoble 9 Lyons 9 
Fountainbleau and finally Paris--the story was the same . 
Louis XVIII was forced to flee to Belgium and on March 20 9 
Napoleon was back in the Tuileri es o 
Upon landing in France Napoleon made liberal promises 
to the people o He acknowledged his past wrongs and guaran-
teed peace and a constitution o This last obligation he 
immediately set about to fulfill and appo i nted several dis ~ 
tinguished personalities to accomplish this task o Sine~ 
these figures became embroiled in debate Napoleon drew up an 
Acte Additional to the Constitution of the Empire and sub-
mitted it to the population o This act was accepted by a 
large majority but many 9 especially the republ icans 9 were 
hardly satisfied with the new constitution and its author o 
In the meantime the Congress of Vienna had declared 
Napoleon an outlaw and stated its determination to drive 
him from the throne o The powers ma i ntained that they did 
not attack the French people ; they were fighting Napoleon o 
Napoleon began preparations for war o The army was 
strengthened 1 arms production increased 1 and by June he had 
a large 9 well-trained force ready for the field o He then 
a dvanced to meet BlUcher and Wellington in Belgium o - Hi s 
plan was to drive between the two armies and rout them 
separately o On June 16 9 he met Blllcher at Ligny and defeat ed 
him o Blttcher fell back and Napoleon dispat ched Grouchy with 
30 1 000 troops to prevent BlficherYs union with Wellingtono On 
the same day Ney had met Wellington but had fa i led to des-
troy him o Well i ngton ~ however, was forced to withdraw to 
Mont . St o Jean . Napol eon i s army followed and on June 18, 
1815, the two forces met in combat . Grouchy was not able 
to detain BlUcher and a force under BUlow advanced toward 
3 
the scene of the battle o Late that afternoon Billow attacked 
Napoleonis right flank o This was the decisive blow and thus 
was Napoleon defeated at Waterloo o 
Napoleon returned to Pari s and f ound the city i n fer-
ment and the assembl i es clamor i ng for his di smissal . He 
submitted and on June 22 1 1815 , abd i cated . l 
FACTORS INFLUENCING NAPOLEO NIC LITERATURE 
English literature on Napoleon 9 s Hundred Days between 
the years 1815- 1~30 proves to be quite hosti l e to his adven-
ture o English wri ters of thi s era do not concentrate on the 
Hundred Days , as such , and most of the accounts are included 
in bi ographi es of Napoleon . 
Engl i sh hi stor i ans lagged--and were to cont i nue to do 
so for a long whi le--behi nd their f ellow historians on t he 
continent . They were not concerned wi th any phi losophy of 
hi story--at least thi s was not evi dent i n t he wri t i ngs con-
cerning the Hundred Days . The ir j udgements were colored by 
1Good accounts of the Hundr ed Days are found i n the f ol-
lowing ~ Louis Adolphe Thi er s , Hi sto~ of the Consulate and 
The Empi re of France Under Napoleon , ol . XI . (Philadelphi a , 
Is,4) ; J o M. Thompson , Napoleon Bonaparte , (New York , 1~52 ) ; 
F o M. Kircheisen , Napoleon (New York , 1,32) ; T. A. Dodge , 
Great Captains ~ Napoleon (New York , 1907 ) . 
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their prejudices and the only rules regulating these conclu-
sions were their biases o Anything that was contrary to the 
interest of the English aristocracy was subject to severe 
criticism o There was no pretence to scientific objectivity 
and often political affiliat i ons played a part in these 
authors' decisions o The Tory writers pictured Napoleon as 
a destroyer of liberties and England --the Tories- - as restorer 
of peace o George Brandes sums the situat i on up very well 
when he asserts that~ 
The political background of the intellectual life 
of this per i od is o o o undoubtedly a dark one-- -
dark with the terror produced in the middle classe~ 
by the excesses of the liberty movement in France o 
The authors with which we are concerned serve as excellent 
illustrations of this situation . They were conservatives 
and sought to exalt the position of the Tory party as 
savior of the world o 
Helen Maria Williams was born in London in 1762, the 
daughter of an army officer o She spent most of her life 
in France, however , and was in that country during the en-
tire period of the Revolution and in 1815 she wrote one of 
the earliest accounts of the Hundred Days . She had at first 
felt sympathy for the Revolution but had recanted when it 
became vicious and had welcomed Napoleon's ascent because 
she felt he would stop the bloodshed . This hope, however, 
had been quickly smothered , for instead of stopping the 
2George Brandes, Main Currents in Nineteenth Century 
Literature tr . by Diana White and Mary Morison (London, 
1,01-1,05), IV . , p . 30 0 
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slaughter he had merely channelled it into another courseo3 
Miss Williams is extremely important to this period for 
later accounts follow closely her presentation of the Hun-
dred Dayso As one biographer notes~ 
The honesty with which she wrote carried conviction 
to many of her readers; and there can be little doubt 
that her works were sources of many erroneous opinions 
as to facts~ which have been largely accepted as mat-
ters of historyi instead of--as they really were, in 
their origin4--the wilful misrepresentation of inter-est partieso 
John Gibson Lockhart is important in that he represents 
a later writer of Napoleon 9 s Hundred Days=-182,--who reflects 
the pattern set by Miss Williamso He was born in 17'4~ the 
son of Reverend John Lockhart. He proved to be a brilliant 
student and became a distinguished member of the student 
body at both Oxford and Edinburgh. Lockhart was an aggres-
sive Tory pamphleteer and soon gained recognition as a 
writer which won for him the editorship of the Q:µarterly 
Reviewo His most famous work is the biography of his father-
in-law~ Sir Walter Scott.5 
-The Tory writers take the position that Napoleon vs 
return was a well planned conspiracyo This position can 
3John Ko Laughton~ tTHelen 
tionary of National Biograph1~ Sir Sidney Lee (London~ 1,17 ~ 
4 
~- » p. 404. 
Maria Williamsn~ The Dic-
edo Sir Leslie Stephen and 
XXI~ p. 404-o 
5Leslie Stephens~ ~John Gibson Lockhartn~ The Dic-
!J:onary of National Biography~ XII» ppo 47-4So ~- ~~ 
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be understood if we keep in mind that they were attempting 
to justify the policy of the British during the Hundred Dayso 
If Napoleon had returned against the will of the French peo= 
ple and as their oppressor then the allies were right in 
crushing him. It is with this theme that these authors 
are occupied. 
TORY VIEWS OF NAPOLEONiS HUNDRED DAIS 
The return of Napoleon to France was viewed with hos-
tility by the Tory writers and of these Helen Maria Williams 
is the most critical; for her it represented a well-planned 
conspiracy. She felt that it was inconceivable that Bonaparte 
would throw himself into France with only a handful of fol-. 
lowers; after all~ it had not been a year since he had to· 
disguise himself in order to escape from the country" She 
held.that this revealed his cowardice and that he would not 
have ventured a return unless he had been assured French 
support: It was too much of a coincidence that all of the 
troops happened to be located in places other than the route 
that Napoleon was to travel; it was also strange that the 
fleet steered clear of the waters between Elba and Provence. 
The return, she asserts~ was too well carried out to attri-
bute to providenceo6 
In discussing the sources of Napoleon's support Miss 
6Helen MariaWilliams 9 _A Narrative of the Events Which 
Have Taken :Place in France From the Landing of Napoleon QQ 
The 1st of March~ 1e12_~ Till the Restoration of Louis XVIII 
With an Account of the Present State of Society and Public 
Opinions (London~ 1815)~ ppo 28-30. 
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Williams contends that it lay primarily in the army. The 
Emperor and the eagles were the symbols of their well being 
and they felt that they the:msel ves shared a part of his mili-
tary glory o They remembered the pleasures that had awa.i ted 
them after a battle; the sacking of towns 1 the feast offered 
them by the people of conquered areas and they also recalled 
the favor and prestige they enjoyed at homeo All of these 
thingsi she maintainsj the officers identified with Napoleon 
and this nblood-thirsty" element sought to restore him to the 
throne" With every mile of his advance his army "snow balledTf. 
He met no opposition for the way was well paved for his ad-
vance.7 
Miss Willims asserts that there is other evidences to 
support her theory of a widespread conspiracy: the defec-
tion of Ney and an incident at Cannes, the point of landingo 
The members of the administration were deeply in involved in 
the plans for Napoleonvs returno At Cannes the National 
Guard had offered to take Napoleon into custody but the pre-
fect had refused their services and had maintained that this 
could not be done for he had not received orders to that 
effecto8 :Miss Williams also stat.es that Ney admitted that 
he intended to join the forces of the Emperor even while he 
was telling Louis XVIII that he would"· .. bring Napoleon 
back in an iron cage."' This she classifies as "black perfidyTf 
7Ibid. 9 pp. 33-35° 
8Ibi51,o i p. 37. 
'Ibid. i Po 45° 
and asserts that ffo o o his country will have slight compen-
sation for this terrible actj even knowing that he is 
condemned to be marked in historyofllO 
There was nothing miraculous in Napoleon's journey, 
maintains Miss Williamsi it required no display of courage. 
The people who would have opposed him were unarmedj defense-
less and those who could have stopped him were ready to 
receive him with open arms. Here Miss Williams, like other 
writers of this period, feels it is her duty to offer a 
warning to posterity against the "military spirit" which 
can provide for the conquest of onevs own country. The 
thing called glory breeds contempt for the rights of one's 
own countrymen as in the case of the French army for it con-
quered its homelandoll 
Miss Williams declares that the people had no choice 
but to submit to the usurper; they were in no position to 
offer active resistance. The solons of Paris were, however, 
soon busy and they bitterly criticized tte new government.12 
This minimum of opposition did not give a true picture of the 
sentiments of the people; they much preferred the allies to 
Napoleon for the allies had set a precedent for kindness in 
their conquest of France in 1g15. They had won the hearts 
of the French nationo It was not to be supposed that the 
people preferred the harsh rule of Napoleon to freedom under 
lQJbido ~ Po 450 
11Ibido~ PP• 46-470 
12Ibid. , p. 64. 
' the Bourbons "l3 
Sir Walter Scott » a leading literary figure in early 
nineteenth century England, was also interested in NapoleonYs 
career and maintains that Paris was the center of a conspir-
acy for the return of Bonaparte but that its ramif i cat ions 
extended throughout France o The republicans and the Bona-
partists had joined together to bring about the fall of the 
Bourbons o First, they had reduced the army to a point that 
was dangerously low and which was also to stir up discontent 
among those off icers and men that were dismissed o Another 
device used by these plotters was the practice of sending 
men to the land sales and having them spread the rumors that 
it was not safe to buy or to own national land ol4 
Scott asserts that the plot against Louis XVIII consisted 
of two enterprises o The first was to be achieved by the land-
ing of Napoleon in France when the good will of the soldiers 
and the fear and suspicions spread widely against the Bourbons 
were to insure him of a good reception o The second branch of 
the conspiracy involved a march on Paris by the army of the 
Northeast and capture the royal family so as to give the new 
government a hostage o Fortunately i however, the second part 
was soon uncovered and thus failed to materialize ol5 
13 Ibid o, PP o 62-63 ° 
14Sir Walter Scott, The Life of Napoleon 
Emperor of the French With~ Preliminary View 
Revolution (London, 18~ III , pp o 194-199. 
15Ibid o j P o 20l o 
Buonaparte, 
of the French 
Napoleon vs reception , maintains Scott, was quite exu-
berant but this was only to be expected for the approach 
to Paris was through territory that had always been favor-
able to Napoleon . Then too , this was the area in which 
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the Campaign of 1814 had been fought and Bonaparte had 
promised stat e aid to repair the damage . It was, moreover, 
noticeable that only the peasants and the rabble cheered 
him o The mercha nts and upper classes merely stood by with-
out expressing the i r sentiments ; they were stunned ol6 
John Lockhart also vi ews the Hundred Days as a well -
planned conspiracy and maintains that plans for a return 
to France were being made soon after Napoleon vs arrival 
at Elba o Just how many were actively engaged in this plot 
and their indentity remains a secret but that they were 
numerous there can be little doubt . In France itself the 
chiefs of police and of the post offic e had been repla ced 
but subordinate officials were essentially unchanged and 
there is considerable proof that they were actively em-
ployed in the conspi racy . These mi nor official s were not, 
however, the only governmental figures involved i n the plot: 
Marshall Soult, the Bourbon Commander-in-Chief of the Army , 
and many other high army officers were also concerned . 
Soult's aid was of particular i mportance for he stationed 
his troops in a manner contrary to the interest of hi s royal 
master and in a fashion whic h proved that he anticipated 
l6Ibid . , pp. 202-203 . 
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Napoleon 9 s return ol7 
Napoleon j according to Lockhart, was not idle during his 
stay at Elba and made skillful use of his resources o In 
the autumn he granted leaves to about two hundred of his 
guardsmen o These men scattered over France singing praises 
of the Emperor and whi le they were probably not aware of 
the mission that they were performing, nevertheless, they 
were doing their Emperor a most valuable service o They were, 
asserts Lockhart, preparing the minds of Frenchmen for the 
return of Napoleon ; The rumor spread that he would return 
in the spring of the coming year 1 and " o he was toasted 
among the soldiery , and elsewhere also, under the soubriquet 
of Corporal Violet ottl8 
On March 1, 1815 j Napoleon again landed on l"rench soil 
and then proceeded on his way to Paris a Lockhart j like 
Scott, asserts that the line of advance was through terri-
tory that had always been quite favorable to Napoleon but 
even then the enthusiasm was not overwhelming o The army 
was the chief advocate of the restoration of the Empire; 
Napoleon met force after f orce and each i n turn wavered, 
then deserted the Bourbons to support their Emperor a The 
way had been prepared for him by his supporters a In Paris 
they propagandized the populace wi th i deas that Napoleon ha d 
changed ; he had learned his lesson and wanted to returnj not 
(New 
17J o G. Lockhart, Esq o The 
York, 1,00) 1 II, P o 258-o -
18Ibid oj P o 258, 
History of Napoleon Bonaparte 
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as a despot 1 but as first citizen of the nation. His talents 
would now be devoted to ~he true welfare of the people of 
France. Rumors were also spread that Austria 1 England and 
Russia knew of his return and fully approved; they would not 
hazard another war for the benefit of the Bourbons. 1' In 
spite of all these efforts~ Lockhart maintains that the peo-
ple were not really aroused and quotes Napoleon himself as 
explaining the success of his return thus~ ff • it is 
disinterested people who have brought me back to mJ capital. 
It is the subaltern and the s.oldiers that have done it all. 
I owe everything to the people and to the armyon20 
Lockhart sees nothing unusual in NapoleonYs journey 
from the sea to Paris. It was not a remarkable adventure 
but another part of tra well planned conspiracy. Recon-
quest of France without firing a shot was not an august 
accomplishment for 1 after a.11 1 the army desired NapoleonYs 
return and was itself deeply involved in the plans. Lockhart 
makes these statements 1 as did his contemporaries, without 
any evidence to support his thesis. This is a practice that 
is too 9ften prevalent in their writings concerning the 
Hundred Days. 
The Tory writers were concerned to a considerable de-
gree with NapoleonYs motives and purposes. Miss Williams 
was certain that the populace was not fooled by Napoleon's 
1'Ibid. » pp. 265-266. 
20ibid. i p. 267. 
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"· .• smiling ways and show of penitence.n21 They knew that 
the constitution makers were wasting their time and that as 
soon as Bonaparte had gathered the reigns of state into his 
hands and his power was firmly secure, he would abolish the 
constitution and send his republican ministers off to"· .. 
work his El ban iron mines. . . . n 22 Napoleon, she held , did 
not disappoint this judgement; he was not long in throwing 
off the veil of the democrat and assuming the robes of the 
emperor. He refused to debate with the framers of the con-
stitution and at length retired to the Elysee, surrounded 
by his trusted• army, and drew up an Acte Additional to the 
constitution. 23 
Miss Williams also asserts that in promugulating his 
Acte Additional Napoleon again exhibited his despotic 
nature. An election was held but in effect it was nothing 
more than an imperial mandate. Bonaparte was now exposed 
and could no longer give the appearance of a democrat, 
The people as a whole were greatly disheartened and she de-
clares that all were commonly agreed that Bonaparte·was the 
most daring of impostors, He not only made claims for his 
democratic intentions but also maintained that he had made 
an agreement with the allies and he asserted that he had 
returned with their approval and that he was to receive his 
wife and son. He went even further and advanced the argument 
21Ibid., p. s,. 
22williams, p. s,. 
23Ibid., pp. 10,-110. 
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that if he had deceived the people of France by minimizing 
the chances of a renewal of the wars that it was only because 
he himself had been betrayed by the allies; yet after such 
acts of irresponsibility, after such despotism, he expected 
the people of France to fall down and wqrship him and his 
constitutiono 24 
Helen Williams declares that Napoleonfs Elban experi-
ence had not really changed him but that he was still the 
desport, the coward, he had always beeno The Hundred Days 
was merely a continuation of his first reign" If, she 
maintains, he had really had the interest of France at 
heart then he could have performed, perhaps, the most un-
selfish act ever committed by a monarch; he could have 
abdicatedo This proposition was whispered to him on the 
Field of May, a public gathering held to approve the Acte 
Additional. His country, she argued, would certainly, in 
the end, be defeatedo He might win a few battles but his 
destiny was not to retain the throne of Franceo Surely a 
person with Napoleon?s foresight could not fail to see 
thiso He could have left the country admist the cheers of 
his countrymen and "o o o this last scene of his public exis-
tence would have shone like a track of unsullied light, along 
a dark and stormy horizonon 25 But, proclaims Miss Williams, 
Napoleon did not have the qualities necessary to perform 
such a noble acto He had only his selfish interest at 
24Ibido' PPo 120-1220 
25Ibido, Po 1650 
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heart and so failed to take advantage of this opportunity o26 
Scott is not so harsh in his judgement of Napoleon on 
matters concerning his reign during the Hundred Days o Scott 
doubted Napoleon's sincerity in stating his intentions to 
reign as a monarch o27 Bonaparte soon revealed his real 
plans for after he had decreed freedom of the press he 
suppressed a number of papers that dared attack him o The 
matter of a constitution would also indicate that he had 
changed little for he merely decreed an Acte Additional. 
He disregarded the avowed purpose of the meeting of the 
Field of May to approve the new constitution and, too , 
the people did not share in its elaboration o28 
Lockhart likewi se attempts to prove that Napoleon was 
motivated by a lust of power and that his actions did not 
take the welfare of France into consideration but only his 
own well-being o In decrees i ssued soon after his landing 
on French soil he had declared that a constitution would be 
drawn up and that he would obey it yet he soon proclaimed 
an Acte Additional.2, Lockhart also argues that Napoleon 
had no real justification, except to soothe his pride, for 
the return and , one by one, attacks Napoleon 1 s reasons for 
26Ibid o, PP o 164-165 . 
27scott feels that most of Napoleon 1 s acts during this 
period were to conciliate the English ; but quickly adds that 
the British were not so easily duped . 
28scott, pp . 218-226 0 
2,1ockhart, pp . 27,-280. 
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the breaching of the treaty of fountainbleau . Napoleon, 
he asserts, attempted to divert disaster by defending his 
actions and in a letter to the Congress of Vienna he pointed 
out that his wife and child had been detained by the court 
of Austria . With this affair, Lockhart says, the king of 
Austria could have nothing to do . Secondly, Napoleon argued, 
his pension had not been paid; a legitimate reason, but had 
he complained to the Congress of Vienna there would have b~en 
a redress . 30 Thirdly, Napoleon decla·red that he had been re-
called by the voice of the French nation . To this Lockhart 
replies that it was not the French people that recalled him 
but that his successful return was" · •• in consequence of 
the treason of the army, and the intrigues of a faction, in 
contrast to the wishes of the nation as a whole . n31 
Lockhart maintains that Napoleon was resorting to all 
sorts of devices to satisfy the people of France and to 
divert their eyes from the threat of war . He granted free-
dom to the press and abolished Negro slavery and the slave 
trade. Lockhart feels that the latter measure, especially, 
was merely a means of deception~ 
Who could seriously believe that at that moment of 
tumult, ere France was even in semblence entirely 
his, and while all Europe was arming against him, 
he had leisure for the affairs of Negroes? 
30ibid ., p . 258: This , Lockhart admitted, was undoubt-
edly known to the Congress . Here he relates that : "Sir 
Neil Campbell early suspected that some evil was hatching 
and repeatedly remarked on the absurdity of withholding 
NapoleonYs pension, thereby tempting hi m, as it were, to 
violence . " 
3libid . , pp . 272-273. 
17 
The people as a whole~ he maintains, quickly saw through 
such measures and instead of fixing their eyes on "o o o the 
distant horizon watched even more closely the foreground."3 2 
Lockhart has little to say of the military campaign of 
1815, but does feel that Napoleon had no other alternative 
but to advance to meet the enemy. The affairs in France 
were such that he could not afford to conduct another de-
fensive battle for" o the fatal example of 1814 was 
too nearo O O 0 "33 Only by a brilliant campaign, as of old, 
could he hope to retain his position and consolidate his 
power. He must advance to meet Wellington and Blttcher in 
Belgium.34 
M6st of Lockhart's analysis of the battles is devoted 
to praise of the allied commanders; Wellington's position 
at Waterloo, the target of considerable criticism, he feels 
was excellento35 To the British as a whole he offers this 
message~ 
It is to be hoped that the British nation will con-
tinue to see, and to reverence, in the contest and 
in its results~ the immeasurable advantages which 
the sober strength of a free, but fixed constitution 
possesses over the mad energies of anarchy on the one 
hand, and on the other~ over all that despotic self-
ishness can effect, even6under the guidance of the 
most consummate genius,3 
32rbido, p. 27~L 
33rbid., p. 2820 
34Ibido i po 282. 
35rbido, Po 2a,o 
36Ibid., Po 330. 
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Miss Williams is concerned with the Battle of Waterloo 
only as it reveals the true nature of Bonaparte . Napoleon, 
she asserts 1 should have perished on that battlefield but 
he was too much of a coward to die such an honorable death . 37 
Instead, he returned 1 or rather fled 1 to Paris and started 
plans to dissolve the Assembly . Luckily Lafayette discov-
ered the plot and warned the members of the Chambers. They 
resisted Napoleon» foiled his plans and forced him to abdi-
cate for a second time thus ridding of the" · .. parasite 
who had long sucked the blood of her youth and suppressed 
the freedom of her people . n38 
FACTORS CONCERNING NAPOLEONIC LITERATURE DURING THIS PERIOD 
The authors concerned with Napoleon vs Hundred Days 
during this period were not professional historians but 
were individuals pursuing a literary career . Miss Williams 
began writing quite early when at the age of twenty her 
Edwin and Eltruda 1 a legendary tale, was published . Lockhart 
was editor of the Quarterly Review and Sir Walter Scott was 1 
of course, one of the most widely known novelists of his 
day. History in England was considered for a long period of 
time as a branch of the belle-letters . It was the occupa-
tion of the gentlemen of leisure 1 digni fied statesmen 1 t he 
clergy or the literary worker . The universities continued 
37Williams 1 p . 180 . 
38Ibid. 1 PP · 1s,-1,o . 
to cultivate the classics whi le instruction in history was 
almost nonexistent o3 ' 
Certai n common tendencies ·may be ascertained in these 
early accounts of NapoleonYs Hundred Days o The Napoleonic 
wars had stirred up a feeling of national awareness and this 
is evident in the l i terature ' Concerning NapoleonYs return o 
Lockhart , for example , i s noticeably outspoken in hi s acclaim 
of the perfection and gen i us of British institutions o He 
states that NapoleonYs Acte Additional contained all the 
elements necessary for a good and wise government : it pro-
vided for a constitutional monarchy, a hereditary peerage, 
and in general all the qualities of the British government o40 
This feeling of Anglo - Saxon superiority is also expounded by 
Captain Robert Batty, a profess i onal soldier who wrote a 
short account of the Campaign of 1815 0 He feels that only 
the British could have withstood the terrific onslaught at 
Waterloo. No other troops , not even the French, possessed 
the cool courage and steady endurance of the English soldiers o4l 
There was also the tendency to exalt the general role of 
' 
the English in the Napoleon i c wars o They were solely respon-
sible for the defeat of Napoleon and England was the restorer 
3,J o WO Thompson, A History of Historical Writing 
(New York, 1,42), II , p~ 280 0 
40Lockhart , PP o 280-281. 
41Robert Batty , A Sketch of the Late Campaign in 
The Netherlands, (London, 1815~ ~2-3_0 __ 
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of peace 1 the liberator of conquered nationso The Prussians 
had helped at Waterloo but had only appeared when the French 
were on the brink of destructiono42 
The social unrest of the period immediately following 
the peace settlement in 1815 no doubt contributed to the 
hostility to Napoleono The words Napoleonj Jacobinj and 
republican were synomous; they all stood for radicals who 
would do away with the existing order of things but these 
English writers being JI for the most part 1 members oft he 
upper and middle classes were shocked by this attack and 
desired to preserve the status quoo43 
The extreme prejudice towards Napoleon was only the 
natural result of the long period of conflicto There had 
been many in England who had at first welcomed the French 
Revolution but as anarchy developed they had come to des-
pise the upheavalo When Napoleon came upon the scene they 
were ready to embrace him but he appeared to them to be 
lustful for power and they turned from him tooo English 
sons had been lost .fighting him and many of the living had 
been victims o.f his acts in one way or anothero This situ-
ation had been intensified by the accounts in the newspapers 
which denounced him as a tyrant and by the caricaturists who 
pictured him as a hideous animalo England had learned to 
hate him and now that he was no longer a threat English 
42 
John Boothj The Battle of Waterloo {London 1 l816)j 
p O 43 0 
43 o Jo Wo Thompson 1 II~ po 2ol. 
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writers could not easily for get the fear to which they had 
been subjectedo 
It is for these reasons that the English writers between 
1815 and 1830 were so bitter towards Napoleon's Hundred Dayso 
This hostility was accentuated by events in England during 
the same period and there was the ever present fear in the 
minds of the English ruling class that a revolution similar 
to that of 178, would occur in Britain and cost them their 
positionso The English riots in the years immediately 
after 1815 raised the specter of the storming of the Bastille 
and Napoleon was the heir of ,a,. 
CHAP'l'ER II 
THE NAPOLEONIC LEGEND, 1827-1840 
English historiography in the years between 1827 and 
1840 retained the characteristics of the preceeding period 
but a most striking development rears its head in the reac-
tion against the earlier "Tory" literature on Napoleon. 
This nrevolt" was closely connected with the politics of 
the day and charges are now definitely made that opponents' 
accounts are mere fabrications with the purpose of glorify-
ing or .slandering parties. The conflict is well illustrated 
by an article appearing in the Quarterly Review which quoted 
Hazlitt as asserting that"· .. a Tory is not a man 9 but a 
beast . , ." 1 and continuing his assult states thai; they are 
styed in prejudices and mistake truth and falsehood as some-
thing to buy and sell, The Tories trample on", •• the 
plea ?f humanity and lives like a caterpillar on tre decay 
o.f public good ••. ,n Hazlitt derives particular delight in 
assulting the Duke of Wellington and proclaiming that he was 
"· .• glad the Duke is not an Englishman."2 
. 1"Hazlitt' s Sketches of Public Characters'', The 
Quarterly Review, XXII (1~20), p. 161. 
2Ibid., p, 162: HazlittYs st•tement concerning the 
Duke of""°Wellington arises from the fact that he was born 
in Ireland. 
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This conflict is further illustrated by an article 
appearing in the Whig organ , The Ed i nburgh Review. In 
23 
reviewing Contempora:r:y History , a work by a prominent Tory 
pol i t i c i an Sir John Wal sh, i t ma i ntai ns that he is not pro-
perly equipped to attempt the writing of such an account: 
" the writer o o • has entered on a t a sk for which he 
ha s no appropriate qualification ; --not the j udgement--not 
the fairness . "3 In this same article the Tories are accused 
of mal - administration . Walsh ?s charge that the Whigs are 
radicals brought the answer that" · o . a wise statesman , 
and a just historian, ought to see further into things than 
the Whipper- in for a party o o .. "4 
The "Whig" writers , like their predecessors were l i ter-
ary people and not historians, express the liberal philosophy 
of the time by declaring that government has responsibil i ty 
for the public good . They have lost much of their fear of 
the masses and assert that the Congress of Vienna--the Brit-
ish representat i ves , Tories--were not justified in declaring 
Napoleon an outlaw o 
Romanticism is another noticeable element in the 
appraisals of Napoleon Ys Hundred Days during this period and 
the Whigs p i ctured Napoleon as returning admist the acclama-
tion of the French people and as being s i ncere in his assertions 
that he intended to serve as a constitutional monarch ; they 
3"Chapters of Contemporary 
LXIII . (1e36), p . 246 0 
4rbid . , pp . 260-262 . 
History", The Edinburgh Review, 
• 
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practically ignored or rationalized certain of his actions 
that would indicate that he was not altruistic as they would 
have us believeo Emotions rule over reason in these authors' 
evaluations o This is especially evident in William H. Ireland's 
position concerning the Acte Additional when he asserts, in 
his biography of Napoleon, that it met with acclamation for 
people had faith in Napoleon and knew that he would not be-
tray them, therefore, he was more n ••• honored and lauded 
••• n than ever. His conduct during this period was admir-
able and he behaved in a manner to deserve the acclaim of the 
population s ince the constitution, by which Na poleon would 
abide, was one that expressed the wishes of the people . 5 
This controversial position Ireland proclaims as fact, appar-
ently needing no further confirmation . 
In spite of their justifications of Napole on these authors 
still display an intense British nationalism. They are con-
vinced of the superiority of British institutions and are 
strong advocates of the doctrine of Anglo-Saxon superiority . 
This attitude is strikingly illustrated by George Bussey, a 
literary folklorist, when he asserts that the French troops 
at Waterloo were"· •. evidently no match in steady endurance, 
impertuable valor, and discipl i ne . , . " to the English soldiers , 6 
Bussey, of course, i gnores the fact that the ma j ority of 
Well ington's army was German . 
5william H. Ireland, The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte 
(London, 1828 ), IV, p . 279-. - -- -
6George M. Bussey, History of Napoleon (London, 1840), 
p' 5 27 0 
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Napoleon himself had a great deal to do with the 
shaping of the Napoleonic Legend. There can be little doubt 
that the Memorial, dictated by Napoleon on St. Helena, exerted 
considerable influence upon the writers of this era. The 
arguments they present are practically those of the Emperor . 
In fact, Napoleon himself hardly presents a more favorable 
account of the Hundred Days. 
Among the outstanding authors of the period, William 
Hazlitt was the most prominent. Hazlitt was born April 10, 
1778, at Maidstone. He was educated chiefly in his fatherYs 
house and early letters indicate that he was a precocious 
child. The son of a Unitarian Minister who had studied under 
Adam Sm ·.th, he grew up in the sturdiest nonconformity and 
the"· .. passion for civil liberty was as much the substance 
of his nature as the celtic grace of his speech."? Hazlitt 
was especially noted as an essayist and as a l i terary cri tic. 
He was interested in philosophy, politics, and literature and 
produced works in each of these fields . He was a liberal, re-
flecting i deas in advance of his time and is reported to have 
been the most hated man in England. 8 
Another significant writer interpreting the Hundred Days 
was Richard Henry Horne. He was born in London on January 1, 
71eslie Stephens, "William H. Hazlitt", Dictionarv of 
National Biography XXV, p . 318. 
8Ibid . , pp . 317-323 . 
26 
1803 and was educated at Sandhurst with ideas about entering 
the services of the East India Company. Receiving no appoint-
ment, however, this incurable romantic became a midshipman 
in the Mexican Navy and fought in the war against Spain . 
Horne was the author of a considerable number of books and 
poems but was also active in politics. In about 1841 he was 
employed by the government of England to report on children 
and young workers in mines and factori~s.' 
WHIG VIEWS OF NAPOLEON 
William Hazlitt repeats essentially the same ideas as 
his Tory predecessors but uses them to justify Napoleonvs 
actions. He maintians that Napoleonvs position at Elba was 
unhappy. He had trusted the allies to fulfill the provisions 
of the treaty of Fountainbleau but as adherence to these pro-
visions were not respected, his circumstances grew steadily 
worse and he was in great danger of removal or assassination . 
The failure of:the Bourbons to pay his pension was a source 
of great embarrassment to Napoleon and there was also the 
threat that he would be removed from Elba to St . Helena, an 
action that would was advocated by the Duke of Wellington . 
In view of these failures to fulfill the provisions of the 
treaty, Hazlitt maintians that Napoleon had good cause to 
return to France or indeed to take any other action that he 
'Emily Tennyson Beal, "Richard Henry Horne", The Diction-
ary of National Biography, XXVII, pp . 358-35,: This emotional 
report was supposed to have inspired Horne's friend, Elizabeth 
Browning, to write "Cry of the Children". 
desired: "He was free of this treaty which had been so 
openly flaunted by the Allied Powers. 1110 
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Hazlitt asserts that France was in a stupor; the coun-
try had to allow the Bourbons to rest"· .• like a toad or 
ugly nightmare on its breast stifling and sucking up the 
breath of independence.nll Only a touch, however, was neces-
sary to wake the nation from this trance and Bonaparte executed 
that touch. The return from Elba was a" · . blow in the 
face of tyranny and hypocrisy, the noblest that was ever 
struck •.• nl 2 and France was once more ready to take up the 
course of her deliverer . Hazlitt then denounced the Congress 
of Vienna as a group that"· • . bartered the independence of 
states and affected to dispose of human nature with an air of 
easy indifference.nl3 
Hazlitt declares that NapoleonYs return was acclaimed 
by practically the whole of France . To charges that only 
the army supported Napoleon 1 Hazlitt answers that these 
arguments are merely fabrications. For Napoleon had often 
travelled several hours ahead of the army, without any guard . 
An army, asserts Hazlitt, is not against a government unless 
this government has been imposed by foreigners by whom they 
(New 
10william Hazlitt, A 
Yo~k, 1907), IV, pp: 
11Ibid . ' p O 1,, . 
12Ibid ., p. i,9 . 
Histor~ of Napoleon Bonaparte, 
1,1-1, 0 
l3Ibid . , p . 1,,: This attitude reflects the British 
reaction against interferring in the affairs of small lib-
eral states and the end of the Quadruple Alliance. 
have been "foiled'' ; and in this case the sentiments of the 
army and the people must be supposed to go hand in hand yet 
the Bourbons had been restored by the allies contrary to the 
desires of the French nation . Hazlitt dismisses the argu-
ment that the Bourbons were popular because they symbolized 
peoples wishes for peace . He asserts that" · . . if peace 
is to be purchased at that price it may always be obtained 
by setting your enemies on the throne, for they will hardly 
make war upon themselves . n14 NapoleonYs return was, he 
maintains, not the product of a conspiracy but the reaction 
. 
to the Bourbon restoration and misrule and the love of the 
people for the i r Emperor . Only Napoleon could have carried 
through such a venture; he ~lone had the confidence, the 
adoration and the respect of the people which would enable 
such a bold move to succeed. 1 5 
Richard Henry Horne was greatly influenced by Hazlitt 
and is given to quoting him frequently and at length . Refer-
ing to NapoleonYs financial difficulties he notes that the 
Emperor became so embarrassed for money that he resorted to 
extreme measures to raise addit i onal f unds: He tried to im-
pose a tax upon the islanders, he cut the allowances of his 
followers, reduced the wages of his miners, sold provisions 
laid up for the garrison and finally had to even sell a train 
of brass artillery to the Duke of Tuscany . In even stronger 
14Ibid . , p. 1,g. 
l5Ibid., p. 1,9 . 
terms he thus points to the dishonorable failure of the French 
government to fulfill its commitments as j ustification for 
Napoleon 1 s return to France ol6 
Horne maintains that other actions of the allies also 
gave Napoleon cause to leave Elba o There were several 
schemes, all known to the Allied Powers, des i gned to remove 
him permanently as a threat to Europe ; one was to remove 
him to the island of St o Helena and another was to assassi-
nate him o With each passing day the chances for the success 
of either scheme grew for Napoleonvs financial difficulties 
would soon make it impossible for him to continue to main-
tain an army of sufficient strength to protect himself o 
Eventually he would have no protection at all, unless he 
attempted a return to France ol7 
For Horne the return was not the result of a conspiracy 
but its success was the product of FranceYs love for Napoleon . 
He resolved to return to France without any pre-arrangements 
or overtures from political friends or conspirators in France o 
No preparations had been mad~ for his landing or his j ourney 
to Paris but he found his subjects ready to clasp him to 
their breast o As he advanced the population flocked to him 
and offered to accompany him to Paris and help him regain his 
throne o Napoleon st i ll felt anxious, however, for the sym-
pathy of the people was not enough ; he required the suppor~ 
16Richard Ho Horne, The Hi story of Napoleon, (London , 
1840), II, PP o 351-35 5° 
l7Ibid . , Po 351 . 
of the army o His fears proved groundless, the army loved 
him as did the people and Napoleon was able to march to 
Paris without firing a shot ol8 
30 
At this point Horne charges that "Party writers" had a 
great deal to do with making Europe believe that Napoleon 
had regained power by" · •• brute force and his ascendancy 
over the minds of the soldiery . "l' These reports, he asserts, 
served the purpose of the time but history has another story 
to record: "He was not only the Emperor of the army but of 
the c i tizens, the people, the peasantry, the masses of men . n20 
That these Whig writers shared the same general pattern 
can be seen in the work of the most romantic of their number, 
George Bussey . He also attempts to defend Napoleon vs return 
to France and states that the failure of the Bourbons to pay 
his pension provided obstacles that were insurmountable . His 
position grew intolerable for there were plans to transport 
him to England . These circumstances had greatly influenced 
him in deciding to risk his future in a return to his coun-
try . 21 
Bussey cannot believe that Napoleon's successful return 
was the result of a conspiracy, but does admit that there were 
extensive, undirected intrigues under way with the object of 
18Ibid . , p . 362 . 
1 ' Ibid . , p . 362 . 
20ibid ., p . 362 . 
21 480-486 . Bussey, pp . 
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preparing the public mind for " o o • the great explosion in 
favor of the Exile of Elba . «22 Although Napoleon had nothing 
to do with these activities his return was expected and he 
was everywhere toasted under the names " •. Corporal Violet 
and Jean 3. .!_ v Epee . . • ." 23 A violet was worn as a symbol of 
fraternity by the commingled parties who, for patriotism, now 
agreed to put aside their differences . Such was the results 
of Bourbon misrule in 1814 . "It would have been treason to -
ward themselves", maintains Bussey, "for a people, who had 
witnessed the energy and partaken the glory of NapoleonYs 
reign, to have submitted such degrading subjection . " 24 
There was, Bussey asserts, no other conspiracy for the restor-
at i on of the Emperor than that produced by"· •. disgust 
and despair on the one hand and of hope on the other • •.. '125 
Everywhere, Bussey proclaims, Napoleon was hailed by 
the people of France~ they welcomed their" · .. restored 
champion as one restored from the dead to save the nation 
from plavery . The nation expected him to raise it from des -
pair and lead it to the ultimate of its hopes and wishes . 11 26 
The Whig writers also disagree with the Tories in analy-
zing NapoleonYs political conduct during the Hundred Days . 
22Ibid. , p . 487 0 
23 . 
487 . Ibid . , p . 
24Ibid . , p . 487 . 
25Ibid " , p . 488. 
26Ibid . , p . 2,6 . · 
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Hazlitt is fulsome in praises of Napoleonvs efforts to rule 
France as a constitutional monarch but condemns the party 
leaders for their lack of cooperation. He asserts that 
''o •• if the return from Elba was the triumph of common 
sense and natural feeling, the ·whole of the Hundred Days 
afterwards may be described as the triumph of trifling and 
cross-purposes.n27 The leaders of the various factions 
realized that the coming struggle would decide whether 
governments were of divine or human origin but even so they 
refused to cooperate and defea_t the enemy armies that were 
advancing on France. They were anxious to give their advice 
to Napoleon but would not compromise and this meant, in real-
ity, that they would not _make any forceful resistance to the 
allies. 2~ Only Carnot possessed the intergity and energy to 
put aside personal views and strive for the common cause. 2' 
In spite of all these complications Napoleon"· •• submitted 
to the bit and stayed pretty well within the limits of the 
constitution o·,a 0 
Horne agrees that Napoleon returned to France with the 
intention of reigning as a constitutionaL monarch. His 
language "breathed a spirit _of libertyn31 which everywhere 
27Hazlitt, p. 21a. 
28Ibid. -- ' pp. 218-21,. 
2,Ibid. , p. 227. 
30ibid., p. 225. 
31Horne 9 Po 363 0 
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inspired hopw and confidence o His first acts, he held , sup-
ported his words . He removed thr restrictions of the press 
and proceeded to appoint Carnot as Minister of the Interior 
and Benjamin Constant as Councillor of State,32 appointments 
indicating that Napoleon was about to become a constitutional 
sovereign.33 Horne felt that there is no reason to believe 
that Napoleon was insincere in this desire while there is 
evidence to suppose that he would have yielded to circum-
stances and governed according to the laws had not the 
allies forced him into war . 34 "It is quite unfair", Horne 
asserts, "to judge Napoleon by the faulty political measures 
whi ch he pursued under his present situation, in all the din 
and hurry of preparing for a decisive struggle . 1135 He wanted 
the cooperation of the legislature in preparing for war but 
could not wait for their discussion of the constitution; there-
fore, he took matters into his own hand, withdrew to the Elysee 
Palace and drew up the Acte Additional to the constitution of 
the Empire . 36 
Napoleonvs actions at th i s junction, Horne observes, 
satisfied no party but its authorship was not its most objec-
tionable feature. What contributed to the a lienation of the 
3 2carnot and Constant were two old republ icans who had 
long opposed Napoleon. 
33Ibid., p. 363 . 
341bid . , p . 371. 
3 5Ibid . , p . 371 0 
36Ibid ., p. 371. 
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republic ans was the provision for a hereditary peeragEL Of 
this Horne is most critical: "o o o to crown the wonderful 
effort of democracy 1 which had restored him to the throne 1 
Napoleon would have imposed on France the most formidable of 
aristocracies, by creating a hereditary legislatureon37 
Horne finds it hard to believe that Napoleon could have enter-
tained such an idea; he knew that the French demanded equality 
above everything else and now he was making an accident of 
birth a route to political power! This feature of the Acte 
Additional, Horne maintains, had an adverse effect upon pub-
lic opinion toward Napoleono The author gives no definite 
reason for this action but takes great care to point out the 
resemblance of this document to the English constitutiono 
He would have us believe that this is a move by Bonaparte to 
conciliate the English and to convince them of his good in-
tentions for if he could win their favor other members of 
the alliance would hardly dare to attack himo38 
Bussey continues the argument for Napoleon?s unselfish 
purposeso He had given proof of his good intentions by de-
creeing freedom of the press 1 abolition of the slave trade 
and by promoting popular education throughout his dominions), 
The people saw in these and earlier measures that Napoleon 
~ 
had truly changed; that his political views had been enlarged 
37rbido 1 Po 372, 
38Ibido j Po 372. 
3,Busseyj Po 514° 
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by adversity and that he was now looking for support from the 
masses and not the privileged orderso The favored groups had 
not hesitated to betray him in his moment of greatest need 
and, Bussey asserts, he had returned no o o cured of his rest-
less ambitions and resolved to make France the freest of the 
f nli-0 ree, o , o 
But, Bussey declares, Napoleon was not to succeed in his 
noble aspirations for he had made many enemies and they were 
determined to thwart himo His dismissal of the legislative 
body had never been forgotten and there were many, those 
whom the Emperor had in the past called "ideologists", who 
were determined to be avengedo These greedy men, Bussey 
holds, forgot that they were inexorably tied to Napoleon~ 
that if his government should fall, their own plans would 
also failo Nevertheless they opposed his programs, greatly 
hindered his preparation of a constitution and his attempts 
to arm the nationo41 
With those who maintained that the constitution of 
Louis XVIII and Napoleon were practically the same Bussey 
violently disagrees. Louis XVIII, he argues, conferred on 
the people a certain amount of freedom as a royal favor but 
Napoleon acknowledged the right of the people to accept his 
Acte Additional or to demand a new contract. This right to 
accept or reject was most important for what Louis XIII had 
4cibid., Po 503. 
41Ibid., Po 5140 
granted he could withdraw at his pleasure but Napoleon had 
signed a compact with the people and would be obliged to 
guarantee these rights to every citizen.42 
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The Whig writers were concerned with the effect of the 
approaching hostilities upon the popularity of Napoleon and 
Hazlitt asserts that this threat did not turn France against 
him. Despite the lack of cooperation by factional leaders 
the Emperor retained the devotion of the people~ soldiers 
returned to the ranks of the army without coercion; arms 
manufacture was doubled; the Emperor was given large amounts 
of money by private citizens. After parades or other public 
gatherings he would often turn over to the treasurer as much 
as eighty or one hundred thousand francs handed to him by 
private citizerts: "The good will of the people was his most 
valuable asset."43 
Hazlitt maintains that the Campaign of 1815 was lost 
because the French marshals lacked the self-reliance and 
fortitude needed to meet the challenges they faced at Ligny 
and Waterloo. He is especially critical of Grouchy and states 
that Napoleon would have been victorious in the end if Grouchy 
had followed the orders of his superior. Hazlitt 9 who is 
said· to have remained intoxicated for several days after hear-
ing of NapoleonYs defeatj describes it as "· .• the greatest 
~nd most fatal in its consequences that was ever fought in 
42Ibid. i p. 5H1, 
43Hazlitt, pp. 234-237. 
the world . n44 He also states that the loss was not only a 
defeat of the French but of the common cause of mankind . 45 
37 
Horne also defends Napoleon against the charge that his 
return had embroiled the French people in another war . In 
fact he presents the rather strained argument that NapoleonYs 
course had actually prevented war since the proprietors of 
the national domain, forming four-fifths of the French land 
owners, would have been compelled to defend themselves against 
the nobles. Other groups would also have been forced to de-
clare against their persecutors . Napoleon had returned to 
deliver France from that coming civil war and it was as a 
deliverer that he was received . 46 
Napoleon had, in fact, tremendous power at his disposal, 
Horne maintains, but " · .. the good-will of the people was 
his greatest resource . n47 This is evident in the high degree 
of confidence that the leader enjoyed among the large capi-
talists and, like Hazlitt , he notes the large amounts of money 
that he was gi ven at public gatherings . Horne, reflecting the 
general antipathy to republicanism, notes that NapoleonYs 
ultimate source of power--the working classes--he would not 
call into action . Had he called these people, who were so 
willing to serve him, he would have turned France into one 
great camp and might have set the allied powers at defiance, 
44Ibid., p . 235. 
45 Ibid . , pp. 274-275. 
46Horne, p. 366. 
47Horne has adopted this quotation, as he frequently does, 
from William Hazlitt . 
3$ 
but thi s he woul d not do for he" o o would not be king of 
the mob o«48 
Horne was greatly concerned with the Campaign of 1815 
and like Hazlitt places the blame for NapoleonYs defeat up-
on Grouchy and Ney . He attributed the drubbing admi nistered 
the Pruss i ans to the skilful di spos i tion of the French troops o4' 
He holds that party attitudes has caused previous English 
hi storians to exaggerate the number of French troops at 
Waterloo and especially accuses Sir Walter Scott and John G. 
Lockhart of this practice o Horne, wi th characterist i c nation-
alism , maintains that the character of the English soldiers 
was the pri me reason that the French did not overrun the 
English positions o They possessed grand self-command and 
unflinching courage o Napoleon recognized and praised them 
for thi s, although it was his ruin o The battle was, Horne 
admi ts , a draw and would have ended as such had not the 
Prussians arrived~ so that victory must be attributed to them 
and not especially to We l lington . 50 
Concerned with the stature of Napoleon , Horne mainta i ns 
that the devotion of the French people proves what a great 
man he was. As an i llustration he points to the words of a 
soldier wounded near the heart : " 0 0 0 an inch deeper and 
you will find the Emperor • • 0"51 and, adds Horne : 
48Ibid ., p . 374 . 
4'Ibi d ., p . 38, . 
50Ibid . , pp . 3,3-415, 
5libid., p . 417 . 
No man who was not humane and noble _ was ever loved 
to this degree by large masses of hi s fellow-be i ngs o 
In all such instances--they are very few--the in-
stincts of human nature are infalliable o Brilliant 
talents , alone, never secure a deep and general love . 52 
A COMPARISON OF WHIG AND TORY WRITERS, 1815-1840 
The decline of the Whig school in the early 1840's 
marks the end of an era in the literature of Napoleon's 
Hundred Days and from this' point on a movement towards 
greater ob j ectivity in this area is noticeable o Among the 
Whi g and Tory schools writing roughly between the years 
1815 and 1840, although there are conflicting views con-
cerning Napoleon, the techniques of English historiography 
are qui te similar . Both schools are in step with the roman-
tic movement of the time o This is the age of Bryon, Keats, 
Shelly, and Sir Walter Scott and the authors concerned with 
the Hundred Days, likewise , allow their emotions consider-
able lattitude . Although the Tories are hostile to Napoleon 
whi le the Whigs come to his defense , nevertheless , in both 
cases the social and politi~al prejudices or values of the 
wr i ters determine their conclusions . There are no attempts 
to recognize these biases and to hold them in check . 
Both schools reflect the influence of party loyalties. 
The Tories are concerned with defending the position taken 
by the government during the Hundred Days and continue to 
proclaim the glory won at Waterloo . The Whigs, however, 
52Ibid ., p . 417 . 
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are attempting to show that this war was , in fact, an act of 
tyranny and are determined to set the record straight from 
their own point of view . Horne, for example, asserts in the 
preface of his book that Tory writers have grossly misrepre-
sented the nature of affairs and that the purpose of his his-
tory is to present what really happened without prejudice. 
Another point of similarity is found in the nationalism 
of both groups . The Tory school is the most vigorous in this 
respect displaying enthusiasm for Wellington and vindicating 
Englandvs participation in the bloody Campaign of 1815 . The 
Whig group, while detesting the part of England in the over-
throw of Napoleon, also exhibits a degree of national pride . 
Even the liberal Hazlitt joins with the Tories in asserting 
the superiority of Anglo-Saxons and British institutions . 
~pile these two schools display some similar tendencies 
the Whigs alone reflect the new liberalism. The Tory school 
was convinced that the English society was perfect in every 
respect. They were horrified at the reforms that were sweep-
ing England, a situation which led Scott to declare in 1830 
that n ••• England is no longer a place for an honest man 
~3 
0 0 0 0 For the Whigs school, however, there were numer-
ous 'ills in English political and social life that needed re-
form . We find them warning against the threat of tyranny and, 
in the case of Hazlitt , admonishing the government for its 
53Brandes, IV, p . 124 . 
failure to act for the well-being of the masses.54 
This was, indeed, a dark e~a in the historiography of 
the literature on Napoleon 9 s Hundred Days. This area of 
interest attracted only aniateur historians with a literary 
bent, while university professors were concerned with ear-
lier periods of history. Steeped in prejudice, allowing 
their emotions to dominate their decisions and often lack-
ing diligence in research, the works of these authors are 
entirely undependable in their lack of objectivity. 
54The Whj~s, however, were not consistent in this and 
at times display their disgust with the masses. They even 
take great delight, as noted above, in proclaiming that 
Napoleon would not"· •• be king of the mob." 
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CHAPTER III 
TOWARD A MORE OBJECTIVE HISTORY 
The last decades of the nineteenth century and the first 
fourteen years of the twentieth saw the decline of many of 
the elements which had for so long hampered an ob j ective 
approach to Napoleonvs Hundred Days o The modified attitude 
towards Napoleon is reflected in the change in English his -
toriography which may be said to have occurred in the years 
between 185, and 1867--the years between Macauley's death 
and the appointment of Bishop William Stubbs to the Chair 
of Modern History of Oxford o1 The commission of Bishop 
Stubbs to this position was unprecedented for he was the 
first trained historian to be named to this post and he proved 
to be a strong advocate of a more scientific approach to 
history o2 From Oxford the movement spread to Cambridge and 
thus the two major universities in England became centers 
for the training of historians o The Cambridge and Oxford 
nschools" are often referred to but these names signify at 
most that the need for a more scientific and ob j ective his -
tory was at last felto They did not exist as organized 
lThompson, II, pp o 310- 311 0 
2Go P o Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth 
Century (London, 1,13), PP o~7-323 o ~ ~~ 
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philosophical bodies of historical thought o In this sense 
the Oxford school began wi th Stubbs and the Cambridge school 
with Seeley o3 
The prefatory note of the first issue of the English 
Historica l Review (1886) declared that " o o o the ob j ect of 
history is to discover and set forth facts o o . on4 Edward 
A. Freeman also voices this opinion when in his Methods of 
Historical Study , a ser i es of lectures delivered at Oxford , 
he asserts that a h i stori an must go n o .. to the law and to 
the test i mony , to the charter and to the chroni cle , to the 
ab i d i ng records of each succeed i ng age • . ."' 5 and should a l so 
d i rect others t o these sources . This, Freeman states , wi ll 
all ow a hi stori an to bui ld on a fi rm foundation and that once 
thi s foundation has been laid on the "rock of origi na l re-
search" a superstructure could be erected that would withstand 
a great many controversies . 6 
Freeman also felt that it would be wi se for the histor-
ian to make use of other branches of learning, for" · .• any 
knowledge which deals in any way with the affa irs of men .• ~7 
may be most valuable to the historian . But , he warns , the 
3Thompson , PPo 310-311 . 
4Fritz Stern , The Variet i es of History from Voltaire to 
the Present (New York , 1, 57) , p o 176 . --
5Edward A. Freeman , The Methods of Historical Study 
(London , 1886) , p o 16 . 
61tid . , p . 16 . 
7Ib i d o, P o 42 , 
44 
historian must make a distinction between branches of know-
ledge which will help him incidentally and other branches 
which stand in more direct connection with his own subject o8 
One of these related fields upon which he places most empha-
sis was philology. The historian was not, however, to pursue 
this in the same manner as does the philologist, for he is 
interested in all languages o The historian should be con-
cerned only with mastering the languages of his particular 
area of study o' 
Freeman also maintains that the reader of history should 
never find himself in any position of greater difficulty than 
that in which he can say " o o o I shall fully understand this 
saying as soon as I find out the meaning of this particular 
word that puzzles meonlO In other words, history should be 
written in a style that conveys meaning, even to the unlearned. 
He shouldj nevertheless, avoid making the mistake of so many 
past historians ; that of sacrificing accuracy for color o 
"Style then and form are not to be scorned ; a narrative that 
is true and dull is better than one that is false and lively ; 
but best of all is the narrative of accuracy of matter with 
vigour and eloquence of style.nll 
Freeman warns against "unhappy delusions" in the study 
of history and maint ians that the best guard against this 
8Ibid., pp o 42-45. 
'Ibid., p o 64. 
lOibido, p. , 1. 
11 Ibid . , p . 104 o 
consists of the "o o o sound study of history, the careful 
weighing of evidence and the thorough sifting of know-
ledge o"12 
The use of documents became a more common practice o 
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Earlier writers had prided themselves on being familiar with 
most of the works on Napoleon but were now frequently repla-
ced by those who began to cite documents . This trend was 
greatly facilitated by Napoleon III's collection of Napoleon's 
correspondence in a series of volumes . 
Ro Go Collingwood, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford and 
a practicing historian 1 in discussing the development of his-
tory i n England maintains that this was a period of progress 
in the methods of writing history : 
They (historians) began to think of it as the proper 
field for a dispassionate and truly scientific study, 
from which partisan spirit, praise and blame, should 
be banished. They began to criticize Gibbon not for 
having taken sides against Christianity in particular 
but for having taken sides at all; Macaulay not for 
being a Whig historian but for being a party historian. 
This was the period of Stubbs and Maitland, the . period 
when English historians first mastered the objective 
scientific critical methods of the great Germans, and 
learnt to study facts in yll their detail with a proper 
apparatus of scholarship . 3 
The authors interested in Napoleon's Hundred Days dur-
ing this period are not all trained historians and do not 
show the same degree of objectivity but there are now a 
respectable number concerning themselves with the study of 
12Ibid o I P o 260 . 
l3R . Go Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York, 
1,46), PP o 146-147 . 
46 
Napoleonvs second reign. Recent history, moreover, now became 
an ar~a wort.hy of the attention of professors and there devel-
oped under the influence .of the new historical method a number 
of noteworthy students of the Napoleonic period. 
The new historical approach is clearly reflected in the 
conclusions of the "objective" writers. They are still con-
cerned with the questions that occupied their predecessors 
but are much more careful in their assessment of reasons and 
blame. These authors view Napoleon 1 s return as the inevit-
able results of Bourbon misrule which they feel explains 
Napoleon 1 s welcome to France and not because of any magical 
powers that he possessed over the people or the army. Other 
questions are handled in a like manner; Napoleon is condemned 
here and praised there but this never reflects the extremes 
that it did earlier. At times the Napoleonic legend appears 
to break through; then again the smug British sense of super-
iority rears its head but these factors are generally hidden 
beneath the crust of self-control and discipline of the hi.s-
torians of this new age in English historiography. 
THE OBJECTIVE "AMATEURS" 
The years between 1S40 and 1s,o witnessed a. decline in the 
interest in the Hundred Days as reflected in a general reduc-
tion in the number of works published concerning the career of 
Napoleon.14 The 1s,0 1 s, however 9 saw the rise of a renewed 
14 · 
The accounts between 1840 and 1s,o follow no definite 
trend but represent the earlier positions of both the "Whig" 
and the '"Tories" with most of the elements of these areas 
making an appearance. 
concern with Bonaparte and his timeso 
While the influence of the new methodology was felt 
among the writers of this period some regarded history as 
their hobby rather than as a profession; an~ while they 
were relatively more object-ive they still retained some of 
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the romantic and nationalistic traits of the earlier liter-
ary historians. Sabjne Baring-Gould usually regarded as a 
novelistl 5 was among the first of the "amateur" historians 
of this period to write of Napoleon's Hundred Days. He 
holds to the view that the Emperor~s return was the fault 
of the Bourbons; their failure to pay his pension provided 
him with justification for leaving Elba. Baring=Gould ad-
monishes the Bourbons for their stupidity, which he asserts 
n ••• is the badge of all the Bourbon tribeon16 This breach 
of the treaty of Fountainbleau was not sanctioned by the 
allies for they all protested against such conduct which 
supplied Napoleon with a pretext to justify his return to 
France"17 
Baring-Gould maintains that the threat of removal from 
Elba likewise prompted Napoleon to attempt a return to F'ranceo 
This removal would have upset all of his plans. Baring-Gould 
does not J.ndicate specifically what plans Napoleon had but 
holds that Bonaparte would have attempted the return in any 
15Mo Choate "Sabine Baring-Gould"~ Dictionary of National 
Biography~ Supplementary Vol. IV~ Po 64. 
16so Baring=Gould~ The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte 
(London~ 1s,7) ~ po 513, 
l7Ibid. 1 Po 5130 
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case, regardless of his ability to j ustify such actions ol8 
Baring- Gould does not ref;~r to Napoleon 9 s return to 
France as the product of a widespread conspiracy but does 
feel that it was planned quite early after his exile to 
Elba and that a number of i nfluent i al people knew and pro-
moted this plot o Napoleon hi mself , he asserts, completely 
duped Campbell o Sir Niel suspected some plotting on Napoleon 9 s 
part , but he did not ant i cipate that it would materi alize so 
soon o He affected great friendship for Campbell and thus 
lulled him into a sense of false security and thi s was to 
provide time to make good hi s escape ol' 
Among the people working for the return of Napoleon 
none, mai nta i ns Baring- Gould , were more act i ve than the 
members of his family o Madam M~re , his mother , Pauline 
Bonaparte , hi s sister and Joachim Murat , his brother-in-
law and King of Naples were all i nvolved and made most valu-
able contributions to the completion of Napoleon 9 s plans~ 
Pauline , Baring- Gould indi cates , served as his chief messan-
ger and made frequent tri ps to the continent working in thi s 
capac i ty . She posses~ed the usual Bonaparte power of attra c-
tion but everyone regarded her as a fool and so she esca,ped 
suspi c i on . Murat hes i tated at f irst but Napoleon assured 
18rbid . , p . 513: Napol eon was evidently qui te concerned 
with the rumor that he was to be removed and expressed his 
feelings to Ni el Campbell , British representative on Elba . 
nr am a soldi er . Let them assass i nate me i f they will o I 
will not be deported . " 
1,Ibid o, p . 516 . 
him that the "o 0 o lion was not dead 9 but only sleeping 0 0 0 
and he, too, took up the cause for the return, Napoleon com-
pleted his plans in February and on the night of the 27th 
Paulin~ gave a ball for the purpose of diverting attention 
,v20 
from this enterpriseo Their calculations were correct; Napoleon 
slipped out, boarded the Inconstant and with his troops sailed 
for It'ranceo21 
Baring-Gould maintains that Napoleonvs march to Paris 
was triumphal~ All along the road the Emperor was joined 
by soldiers, in detachments~ in battalions~ or in entire 
divisions, who tore the white cockade from their caps and 
mounted the tricolorso The Bourbons were abandoned by the 
entire army; nevertheless, except at Grenoble and Lyons, the 
people gave few or no signs of enthusiasm. Many fled from the 
lj_ne of march and the majority of those who remained gazed in 
nstupid bewilderment'' and with "doubt of heart" as to where 
this new revolution would leado22 
Oscar Brownings basically an exponent of educational 
reforms, 23 also maintains that the violation of the Treaty 
of Fountai.nbleau was not only a crime but a tremendous blun-
der o He feels that it is possible that in any case Napoleon 
20Ibid. JI p. 5160 
21 Ibid.ll Po 517. 
22.Ibid. JI pp. 523-524. 
2300 Lowes Dickinsonll "Oscar Browning"» Dictionary of 
National Biographyi Supplementary Vol. IV 1 ppo 126-1270 
would not have remained at Elba but his enemies were doing 
utmost to drive him from his place of refuge o The crimes 
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that were committed against him 1 asserts Browning, were num-
erous; the King of France left him without money, the Emperor 
of Austria robbed h'm of his wife and child, Metternich em-
ployed a nruffian" to debauch his wife, Castlereagh wished to 
transport him 1 Talleyrand to throw him into prison and perhaps 
to assassinate him o These actions naturally rendered his sit-
uation on Elba intolerable and they finally succeeded in driv-
ing him back to France o24 
Browning describes the return from Elba as " o o o one of 
the most marvelous episodes in history o o n25 He asserts 
that there had been no preparations made, no conspiracy brought 
about, no one was involved in the plot. The return took his 
former generals completely by surprise and their attempt to 
offer resistance proved fruitless . The action was arranged 
by Napoleon alone and it surprised Bonapartists as much as 
it did Bourbonists . It was a movement of the people, assis-
ted by the army: France was irritated by the arrogance of 
the government, by the threats and the claims of the clergy 
and the nobles who treated her like a conquered country and 
thus the people followed the cockade of 178 ·. The people and 
the army joined together in a common action. The tremendous 
success of this move, Browning feels, should not diminish 
the credit due Napoleon and should be recognized as the 
24oscar Browning, The Fall of Napoleon (London, 1,07) 1 
PP o 154-155 . 
25Ibid . , P o 182. 
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greatest tribute to his genius for it was he who foresaw the 
results and dared to take the risk of failure. Upon landing 
he was proven correct for he received the most impressive 
kind of Tfplebiscite 11 and was able to regain his crown with 
only four horses and eleven-hundred men. If sovereignty is 
based upon national will, Browning asserts, then Napoleon was 
,iustified in his clajm to the .French throne.26 
Napoleon's situation in 1~15 was quite different from 
thr1t of his oreceeding rej gn, Baring-Gould maintains, for 
the people were no longer willing to follow hi.m blindly. He 
found that they were not so obedient and were determined that 
the Emperor should rule only as a constitutional monarch. 
Napoleon recognized this fact but felt perhaps that thjs mood 
would disappear in a year or two and that he would be able 
gradually to assume his former powers. He seemed perfectly 
happy but it is extremely doubtful, Baring-Gould asserts, that 
he would have remained in this mood. In any case the author 
feels that the allies made a mistake in interfering in French 
affairs in 1~15.27 
Browning applauds Napoleon's actions during the Hundred 
Days and declares that he was sincere in his expressed desire 
to become a constitutional monarch; he abdicated the dictator-
ship, offered representative government, established liberty 
of the press, the liberty of the tribune, and liberty of 
26Ibido, p. 182. 
2713 " G ld ;aring-Jou , pp. 
elections o In spite of these reforms , Browni ng admits, he 
was suspected by practically everyone ; he was threatened 
abroad, abused by the press at home and found treason and 
laziness in the administration . This situation was detri-
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mental to Napoleon for he deteriorated both morally and 
physically between the end of March and the end of May o He 
still possessed those qualities of genius that had so long 
served France but the subordinate qualities of will, decision 
and confidence were gone and he became subject to bodily ail-
ments of a very painful nature . 28 
The Campaign of 1815 is of considerable interest to the 
authors of this period and William ovconnor Morris, a lawyer 
by profession,2, is fulsome with praise of Napoleon's gen-
eralship during this expedition . He feels that public opinion 
made it necessary for Napoleon to wage an offensive war but 
even forced into such a plan he conducted a campaign without 
parallel in the history of the world . The Emperor was out-
numbered by the allied forces almost two to one and were it 
not for the accidents in which" · .• fortune baffled their 
mighty adversary 
been defeated . 31 
.•• ,,30 Wellington and BlUcher would have 
28Browning, p. 220 ~ There has been some controversy 
concerning Napoleonvs ailments during the Hundred Days . 
John Holland Rose presents a full treatment of this subject 
in the appendix of his biography of Napoleon . 
2'Robert Dunlap, "William ovconnor Morris", The Dictionary 
of National Biography, Supplementary Vol II, p . 655 . 
30william 0 9 Connor Morris , Great Commanders of Modern 
Times and the Campaign of 1815 (London , 18,1) p. 325 . 
31Ibid., pp . 318-325 . 
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The first part of the Campaign of 1915 1 Morris declares, 
ends with the battles of Ligny and Quatre Braso Napoleon's 
operations up until this time had been attended with marked 
succes8 which easily might have been complete and decisiveo 
Napoleon had selected, with perfect insight, the true point of 
attack 1 he had brought his army with admirable skill and secrecy 
to the Belgian frontier and aiming at the center of the allied 
line had advanced close to it almost without notice. On the 
sixteenth of June Napoleon had thrown bis army against the 
Prussians. He bad dispatched orders to Ney at Quatre Bras 
commanding D 1 Erlon to attack Bllicher's left flank, a movement 
that would have completely crushed the Prussians o Due to irre-
ponsible action on the part of Ney, Morris claims, General 
D 1 Erlon was recalled and so never completed this maneuver. 
D 1 Erlon had, however, appeared close to the scene of battle 
and Napoleon, not knowing if he was friend or foe, had been 
forced to delay a crushing blow to the Prussian center. This 
mistake saved Blllcher 1 s army from complete annihilation,,32 
Morris maintains that Napoleon was in an excellent posi= 
tion even after the battles of Ligny and Quatre Bras but that 
the subsequent mistakes of his subordinates were to wipe out 
these advantages. The brunt of the blame for the defeat at 
Waterloo is placed on Niarshal Grouchy o Morris describes 
Grouchy as"· .. the Emperor's evil genius on the great and 
terrrible day at Waterloo.n33 Grouchy 1 he notes 1 failed to 
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detain the Prussian army and so allowed them to come to the 
aid of Wellin~ton . Napoleon was not to blame for this, he 
could no more foresee Grouchy 9 s conduct than he could n. o • 
assume that Grouchy would be swallowed up, with his army, 
by an unexpected earthquake . n34 
Barin~-Gould is not too ~reatly concerned with the battle 
of Waterloo, but does maintain that Napoleon failed less as a 
tactician than as a strate~ists in mistakin~ the whereabouts 
of the Prussians . He feels that i f Blttcher had not arrived 
to aid Wellin~ton that there is but little doubt that Napoleon 
would have won at Waterloo .35 
CRITICAL HISTORIANS 
The works of the "professional historians" reflect the 
impact of the methods advocated by Freeman upon the writint 
of history . John R. Seeley, Professor of History at Cambrid~e 
and himself the founder of the "Cambridge schooln, asserts 
that it must have occurred to Napoleon very soon after his 
arrival i n Elba that he could very well return to France . 
The domestic situation under the Bourbons was extreme~y un-
settled and they were daily alienatint more and more of the:ir 
sub .iects . Dis~raced, bewildered and alarmed at the same time, 
the French could think only wi th re~ret even of the re ign of 
Napoleon and a new convulsion seemed manifestly imminent ; 
Napoleon merely took advanta~e of this situation, therefore, 
34Ibid. , p . 360 . 
35Barin~-Gould, p . 541 . 
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to return to France and claim the throhe that awaited him . 36 
Seeley welcomed Bonaparte's return and feels that he 
was blessed by a majority of the people . He states that on 
the ei~hteenth of Brumaire37 Napoleon had put down Jacobinism 
and ~iven the nation order and repose . Napoleon was now sum-
moned, in the name of independence, to protect the acquisitions 
of the revolution and to defend the national honor a~ainst the 
triumphant forei~ner . "The Hundred Daysn, declares Seeley, 
"are the period of popular or democratic imperialism~3g 
Seeley displays how thorou~hly he has investi~ated this 
period when he reveals, what is now an accepted fact, that 
Benjamin Gonstant was the author of the Acte Additiona1 . 3' 
John Holland Rose , Professor of History at Cambrid~e and 
a foremost Napoleonic scholar ,40 also maintains that Napoleon 
had reasons for a return to France but expresses doubts as to 
just what really prompted this . He is most bitter in denounc-
in~ the detention of the Kin~ of Rome and describes it as a 
"heartless action" but holds that Maria Louisa would not have 
joined the Emperor even if she had been allowed to do so . He 
completely dismisses the pension ar~ument as a reason that 
prompted Napoleon's return: " · •• to do so would be to credit 
36John R. Seeley, A Short History of Napoleon the First 
(London, 18,o) » pp . 217=21, . 
37The Coµp d 'Etat of the 18th Brumaire (November,, 11,,) 
refers to Napoleon's overthrow of the Directory and the le~-
islature . 
3g Seeley, P o 222 . 
3,Ibid . , P o 222 . 
40Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Some Historians of Modern Europe 
(Chica~o, 1,42), P o 267 . 
Napoleon with respectable bour~eois scruples by which he was 
never troubledon41 Napoleon's motives for attempting to re-
~ain his throne, Rose asserts, were surely born of his pride 
and ambitions.42 
Rose declares that Napoleonvs return was not, as his 
contemporaries have stated, a miracle before which the voice 
of criticism must remain silent. The Bourbons had been re-
stored by the princes of Europe and this imposition, alon~ 
with the actions of the restored elements, aroused the senti-
ments of the nation o To Rose it is a.mazint that this "o 
house of cards o · o • n43 endured for even eleven months. The 
Bourbons had offended the most powerful French interests--
the military and the a~ricultural ~roups by placin~ officers 
on half pay and by threatenin~ to confiscate the national 
lands that had been sold durint the course of the Revolutiono 
Napoleonvs return, therefore, provided these elements with 
a powerful instrument by which the Bourbons could be expelled.44 
Herbert Fisher, Professor of History at Oxford,45 like-
wise asserts that Napoleon was not brouiht over from Elba by 
a plot or conspiracy but came because he had correctly divined 
the situation in France. Fisher describes Napoleon 9 s march 
41 
John Holland Rose, The Li~e of Napoleon I, Volo II, 
(London, 1,01), Po 4010 
42Ibid. , po 401 o 
43Ibid., p. 40,. 
44Ibid., pp. 40,-410, 
45 Word, A. W., et. al. The Cambridge Modern History 
Vol. IX, p. xxiii. 
57 
to the capital as one of the miracles of history: I! 
he fought no battles; he shed no blood; he was greeted by 
the peasantry all along the way as a savior and friend." 
He promised liberal reforms, not for the benefit of the pea-
sants or soldiers but to make his return more acceptable to 
the lawyers and politicians of Paris. Fisher maintains that 
these reforms meant nothing to the peasants~ "They did not 
care for liberties they wanted to retain their lands.n46 
Fisher holds that the overthrow of the Bourbons was not 
difficult for their support deserted them as soon as Bonaparte 
came into sight. This was not their fault, Fisher explainsj 
for the "Pygmyn had been called upon to t1 ••• fill the shoes 
of a giant ... n47 and was unequal for the task. Louis XVIII 
declared that he was ready to die in defense of his country 
but upon the approach of Napoleon he took to his carriage and 
fled. "To a race which had drunk so seeply of military and 
civil gloryi his rule must have been the beginning of the 
humdrum age.n48 
C. W. Oman, Professor of History at Oxfordi49 is also 
interested in Napoleon's reception by the French people but 
does not feel that he was as well received as did many of his 
contemporaries. He maintains that Napoleon quickly reconsti-
tuted his government upon arriving in Paris but that large 
46 H. A. L. Fisher ttThe First Restoration"j The Cambridge 
Modern Hi~tory, Vol. IX, p. 573. 
47Ibid., p. 574. 
48Ibid., p. 575, 
49w d or, A" W. , et. al. , p. xix. 
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numbers of the population rema_ined disaffected" This 1 he 
holds 1 was particularly true of southe~n trance as is illus-
trated by an insurrection which broke out in the Vend1:l~ on 
May l5o This rebellion 1 though not especially serious 9 was 
troublesome and required the services of ten thousand soldiers 
to restore order. It was only in Eastern and Central France 
that Napoleon could be sure of support and carry out his de-
crees effectively.50 
"The warmth with which the Emperor had been at first 
receivedn, Oman asserts 1 ncooled down unmistakenly when it 
became known that his return meant war with all Europeon5l 
Napoleon saw that he must put forth some program which would 
arouse enthusiasm; and he determined with little hesitation 
that this must take the form of an appeal to the liberal sec-
tion of the nation. This plan was set forth in the Acte Addi-
tiona1 but, Oman maintainsi Napoleon did not intend that this 
should be the permanent constitution of France and asserts with-
out further proof that Napoleon had later admitted as mucho5 2 
Norwood Youngi a prolific writer in many areas of history 1 
enters upon a new trend toward psychological analysis of 
Napoleon and public opinion in explaining the return to France 
and its success. Young states that had Napoleon been given 
his pension, his wife and child and complete security that 
he would still have entered upon his adventure. He 1 like 
50oman 9 "The Hundred Days" Cambridge Modern History 1 
Vol. IX 1 pp. 616-619. 
51rbid. 1 p. 619. 
52rbi~., pp. 619-620. 
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Rose, feels that the factors that prompted Napoleon to attempt 
to regain his crown were ambition and pride. He had been 
accused of cowardice and this was too much for his proud 
spirit. He had to redeem his honor, his vanity, by once 
more ruling France and disproving these charges. On the 
other hand, he had held the position as the most powerful 
ruler in Europe and could not ~ccept a lesser st~tus. The 
Corsican spirit of vendetta, which ends only in death, was, 
he held, embedded in Napoleon's character and his career could 
end only in complete triumph or utter defeat. There could be 
no third alternative.53 
Young asserts that Napoleon had acquired a reputation 
for transcendent unconquerability, and that in the minds of 
the French people NapoleonYs temporary defeats were merely a 
part of his plan as a step toward a greater triumph. This 
legendary prestige, he argues, was the real basis for NapoleonYs 
successful return to France. Even if the people had desired 
resistance they would have hesitated for it would have seemed 
futile; they could not hope to oppose a man to whom, Young 
maintains, the popular mind even attributed power to control 
the winds and the seas.54 
John Seeley argues that Napoleon welcomed the declara-
tion of the Congress of Vienna that proscribed himo This 
gave him the opportunity that he needed so badly of posing as 
53Norwood Young, Napoleon in Exile: Elba (London, 1915), 
pp. 292-294. 
54Ibid., p. 282. 
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the champion of an independent France. Napoleonj therefore, 
sought to take advantage of French patriotic feeling and in-
stead of attempting to defend a far flung empire, he now pro-
posed to defend only France.55 
Rose contends that the proscription of Napoleon by the 
Congress of Vienna was not an act wholly unwarranted. Napoleon 
himself had been no less harsh in his own proscriptions. After 
all, their experiences with Napoleon had been clouded by almost 
constant warfare; his own past was his worse enemy. The allies 
were only trying to stop"· .. the flight of the eagles before 
it safely reached its nest in Paris and was agaJ.n free to prey 
upon them.n56 Napoleon had not in the past given them any rea-
son to trust him and so they did not believe him when he declared 
that he had been cured of his ambitions.57 
Rose maintains that Napoleon 1 s promise of a constitution 
had been held out as bait to the people of France and that 
they eagerly accepted the lure. This had proven, however, a 
source of disappointment for the only constitution they were 
to witness was one of Napoleon's own making. The Acte Addi-
tional was a source of discontentment which became evident 
when the chambers met for the first time with Napoleon's 
opponents elected to positions of importance within assemblies. 
Napoleon recognized the danger and warned the legislators not 
55rbid., pp. 224-225. 
56R ose, p. 411. 
57rbid., p. 411. 
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to "o o o imitate the Greeks of the late Empire by discussing 
abstract propositions while the battering ram thundered at 
their gates O O o",5g but they choose to ignore this adviceo59 
The professional writers reveal considerble interest in 
the Campaign of 18150 Sir John Seeley asserts that of all 
the Napoleonic expeditions this proved by far the most rapid 
and decisive. Napoleon began brilliantly and succeeded in 
separating the two armiesj defeating Blucher and forcing 
Wellington to retreat. But he soon revealed an unwonted in-
dolence and inefficiency. First, he allowed the Prussians 
to escape after the battle of Ligny and then sent Marshal 
Grouchy with 33~000 men in the wrong direction in pursuit of 
them. It was this action that found Grouchy at Wavre on the 
day of the battle Waterloo fighting a useless battle with 
only one Prussian corps and thus allowing BlUcher to keep his 
engagement with Wellingtono60 
Rose feels that Napoleon must assume responsibility for 
the failure of the Campaign of 1815. It is apparent that 
his main purpose was to prove Ney innocent of much of the 
abuse heaped upon him in regard to the battles of Ligny and 
Quatre Bras. Confusion 1 maintains Rose, was to be expected 
from the manner in which Ney had taken charge of his command; 
he did not know his staff officers and under the circumstances 







rightly played a cautious game.61 
Rose not es that Napoleon engaged BlUcher at Ligny and 
called upon Ney to send the corps of D 1 Erlon to his assis-
tance, D •Erlon by chance received the orders first and 
proceeded to carry them out but when Ney considered these 
orders he sent a message to D •Erlon ordering him to return 
at once. This maneuver resulted in confusion in headquar-
ters for these -strange eventualities Rose blames not only 
Ney but Napoleon as well. He argues that a marshal of the 
French army was not without fault when he corrected an order 
obviously based on misunderstanding. 62 
Rose give little credit to the story that Napoleon was 
ill during the Campaign of 1815 and states that he was in his 
usual health amidst the stern joys of war."63 Napoleon 
throve on events which would completely exhaust an ordinary 
being and maintains that few trustworthy proofs are found of 
his supposed illness and many signs that indicate he still 
possessed the remarkable energies of old, "If he was suffer-
ing from these illnesses, they were assuredly of a highly 
intermittent nature."64 
Rose asserts that the mistakes of the Campaign are not 
difficult to uncover. Napoleon had underestimated the 
61 Rose, p. 425. 
62Ibid. i p. 438. 
63Ibid., p. 448. 
64Ibid. , p. 448. 
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strength and the ability of the allies and even after he had 
defeated B1Ucher he failed to take necessary precautions 
immediately necessary to prevent a juncture of the allied 
forces; even when he began to take preventive measures he 
sent a commander with little imagination and experience to 
preform this most difficult of taskso Napoleon was not 
alarmed when he saw BUlow 1 s forces, he still felt that 
Grouchy had the situation under controlo He had no reason 
for his optimism because it had been hours since he had 
communicated with Grouchy and then he had declared his in-
tention to proceed to Wavre. Another reason for defeat was 
the weak link, Rose points out, in Napoleon 1 s intellectual 
armoro Gifted with almost superhuman insight and energy he 
expected the same of his subordinates and he also possessed 
a contempt for the abilities of the opposing generalso These 
mistakes, small perhaps in themselves, added up to defeat at 
Waterloo and only after he had ruined himself and France, Rose 
maintains, did Napoleon recognize the abilities of the Duke 
of Wellington. 65 
Oman feels that Napoleon had under his command one of 
the best armies of his career. He asserts that Napoleon 
needed to gain three days in order to drive between the 
armies of Wellington and BlUcher and that by brilliant maneu-
vering he was able to accomplish this, As a result the two 
allied generals were not able to concentrate their armies 
65Ibid., pp. 470-471, 
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soon enough to prevent Napoleon from separating them and that 
with this advantage Napoleon shotild have been successful in 
his attempt to "divide and conquern.66 
But 1 like Rose, Oman maintains that Napoleon did not 
retain this advantage: He delayed in pursuit of BlUcher 
after Ligny and also failed to press Wellington upon his 
retreat from Quatre Bras. As a result of these delays 
Napoleon soon lost most of the three days needed to in-
sure successo Oman, too~ defends Ney and Grouchy for their 
rule in this campaign and states that their mistakes were 
primarily due to Napoleon's faulty orders. At any rate these 
men were under a tremendous strain for defeat meant the end 
of their careers and probably spelled execution. They ~ere 
definitely not at their best; bravery they displayed in 
abundance but good judgement was often lacking. The fail-
ure of the French army, Oman held, must therefore be 
attributed to the delays and miscalculations of Napoleon.67 
SUMJl,,1ARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Literature concerning Napoleon's Hundred Days was, for 
the first fifteen years after the battle of Waterloo, pre-
dominantly hostile in dealing with his return from Elba and 
the subsequent events of his second reign. These Tory 
66oman, pp .• 624-626 .. 
67rbido, pp. 627-633, 
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writers, so named because of their party loyalties, viewed 
the return as the product of a conspiracy and contrary to the 
wishes of the French peopleo They felt that the population 
was forced to submit to the usurper because he had the support 
of the army. Napoleon Y s promises 1 ·they assert, were broken 
when he thought convenient and he reverted to his old dic-
tatorial practices. The Tories question Napoleon's abilities 
as a general and continually state that Wellington was the 
more able of the twoo The battle of Waterloo also reveals 
the true character of the Emperor and they hold that he was 
a coward because he abandoned his troops wpen disaster seemed 
inevitable; he should have perished on the battlefieldo 
The Tory school was followed by a "Whig" reaction which 
generally justified Napoleon's return and attacked Tory politi-
cal policy of the periodo The Whigs maintained that Napoleon 
had been driven from Elba by the allies and that the French 
people had welcomed his return. They held that the Emperor 
was sincere in his desire to rule as a constitutional mon-
arch and that any evidence to the contrary was the result of 
necessity and not Napoleon's aspirations. This group was 
also concerned with the Campaign of 1815 and felt that the 
French defeat at Waterloo was largely the product of irre-
sponsible actions on the part of his subordinates in no way 
reflected in Napoleon himself. 
The years between 1840 and 1890 witnessed a declipe in 
the interest of Napoleon's Hundred Days but the last decade 
of the nineteenth century saw again a revtval of concern with 
this ~rea. The historians of this period do not fall into 
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the neat pattern of the earlier writers but some generaliza-
tions can be made in their conclusions. They view the 
success of Napoleon's return as the product of his correct 
evaluation of the mind of the French people in the wake of 
the Bourbon restoration. There is also general agreement 
that the Emperor was not sincere in his assertion that he 
wanted only to rule as a constitutional monarch for they 
feel his actions were governed by necessity and not convic-
tion. These writers also attempt to lay the responsibility 
for the defeat at Waterloo on the shoulders of Napoleon. 
They admit that his lieutenants made mistakes but assert 
that the errors of greatest consequence were those committed 
by the Emperor himself. 
From our survey of the writings concerning Napoleon's 
Hundred Days we can conclude that Napoleonic literature from 
1~15 until about 1840 was influenced by party partisanship, 
romanticism and nationalism and that these elements hindered 
the presentation of an objective approach to this field of 
study. The writers of this period were mostly amateur his~ 
torians. The last half of the nineteenth century and the 
first fourteen years of the twentieth centuryi howeveri saw 
the movement for a more scientific history begin and take 
long strides toward maturity. This moveme~ is also reflected 
in the accounts of Napoleon's Hundred Days and historians in 
this periodi while they were not all professional and trained 
in the new research methods, present a much more objective 
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